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2.1  Introduction 
Financial aspects of corporate pension funds have increasingly at- 
tracted the attention of corporate managers, government officials, and 
academics. For example, practitioners have been debating such topics 
as corporations’ right to terminate overfunded plans and retrieve sur- 
plus assets (Hawthorne 1983; Louis 1983; Smith 1983), the contribution 
of corporate securities and leaseholds to pension funds in lieu of  cash 
(Webman 1983), and the burden of  unfunded liabilities on the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) (Colvin 1982; Munnell  1982). 
Among academics, interest has centered on the tax and incentive as- 
pects of corporate pensions. Models of optimal capital structure have 
yielded new implications for plan funding and investment (Black 1980; 
Tepper 198 l), while advances in option pricing theory have illuminated 
the perverse incentives created by PBGC insurance (Sharpe 1976; Trey- 
nor 1977). 
As yet, however, there has been relatively little empirical work done 
on corporate pension funding and asset allocation. Studies by Friedman 
(1983) and Westerfield and Marshall (1983) have produced interesting 
findings, but many details remain to be filled in before a clear picture 
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of these decisions can emerge. Our purpose in this study is to add to 
the stock of empirical knowledge and to pay particular attention to the 
ability of current theory to explain our findings. 
In section 2.2  we outline two different perspectives  on corporate 
pension decisions, the traditional perspective and the corporate finan- 
cial perspective, the latter of which includes the recent theoretical work 
on corporate pensions mentioned above. In section 2.3,  we review the 
small body of previous empirical evidence. In section 2.4, we discuss 
a significant empirical problem, namely, that firms have considerable 
latitude in reporting their pension liabilities and may thus obscure the 
true cross-sectional relationship between funding status and financial 
condition. 
In section 2.5 we discuss our data sources and present our results. 
We  find that there is indeed a significant inverse relationship between 
firms’ profitability and the discount rates they choose to report their 
pension liabilities. In view of this we adjust all reported pension lia- 
bilities to a common discount rate assumption. We then find a significant 
positive relationship between firm profitability and the degree of pen- 
sion funding, as is consistent with the corporate financial perspective. 
We  also find some evidence that firms facing higher risk and lower tax 
liabilities are less inclined to fully fund their pension  plans.  On the 
asset allocation question, we find that the distribution of  plan assets 
invested in bonds is bimodal, but that it does not tend to cluster around 
extreme portfolio  configurations to the extent predicted by the cor- 
porate financial perspective. We  also find that the percentage of plan 
assets invested in bonds is negatively related to both total size of plan 
and the proportion of unfunded liabilities. The latter relationship shows 
up particularly  among the riskiest firms, and is consistent with the 
corporate financial perspective on pension decisions. 
2.2  Alternative Perspectives on Pension Funds 
2.2.1  The Traditional Perspective 
Defined benefit pension funds are segregated pools of capital that 
collateralize the future liabilities explicit (and perhaps implicit) in de- 
fined benefit plans. Viewed from what we shall call the  “traditional 
perspective,” pension funds are entirely separate from the corporation 
and its shareholders and should be managed without regard to either 
corporate financial policy or the interests of  the corporation and its 
shareholders. 
From this perspective, funding decisions should be based solely upon 
the expected future stream of employee pension liabilities, irrespective 
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tion decisions within the fund should be made solely in the best interests 
of the beneficiaries. Unfortunately, it is quite unclear what asset allo- 
cation policy would be best for beneficiaries. For example, if the defined 
benefit liabilities were really fixed such that beneficiaries would not 
not and could not share in any surplus of pension assets over liabilities, 
then the beneficiaries would want a well-funded plan to be invested in 
the least risky assets, presumably fixed income securities. If, on the 
other hand, the beneficiaries were able to participate in the ownership 
of such a surplus, as Miller and Scholes (1981) and Bulow and Scholes 
(1983) have argued, then the optimal asset allocation would be much 
less clear and, in principle, could include virtually any mix of stocks 
and bonds. 
2.2.2  The Corporate Financial Perspective 
In recent  years, academic theorists  have built  an alternative per- 
spective from which pension decisions are viewed as an integral part 
of  overall corporate financial policy. From this perspective,  defined 
benefit liabilities are just one more set of  fixed financial liabilities of 
the firm. Pension assets, while collateral for these liabilities, are really 
just assets of  the firm in that the surplus/deficit belongs to the firm’s 
shareholders. This integrated perspective is then concerned with how 
to manage the firm’s extended balance sheet, including both its normal 
assets and liabilities and its pension assets and liabilities, in the best 
interests of the shareholders. This view explicitly ignores the interests 
of the beneficiaries, in part because their defined benefits are insured 
by the PBGC anyway. From the corporate financial perspective, then, 
the beneficiaries are protected by the government, and the corporate 
pension decisions become what amount to a game between the cor- 
poration and various government agencies and interests, a game that 
can be and should be thought of as an integral part of corporate financial 
policy. 
The tax effects are the first, and for most companies the most im- 
portant, part of this game. In closely related papers, Black (1980) and 
Tepper (1981) argued that the unique feature of pension funds from this 
integrated perspective is their role as a tax shelter. Because firms can 
effectively earn a pre-tax rate of return on any assets held in the pension 
fund and pass these returns through to shareholders much as if  the 
pension fund were an IRA or Keogh plan, the comparative advantage 
of a pension fund lies in its ability to be invested in the most heavily 
taxed assets. 
Presumably this means that pension funds should be invested entirely 
in taxable bonds, as opposed to common stock, real estate, or other 
assets that are in  effect  taxed at lower marginal tax rates for most 
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way, only if) the pension fund is invested in more heavily taxed assets 
such as bonds, the corporation  should fund its pension  plan to the 
maximum extent allowed by the  IRS so as to maximize the value of 
this  tax  shelter to shareholders. The tax effects of  pensions should 
therefore induce corporations to follow extreme policies. Fully funded 
or overfunded pension plans should place their assets entirely in taxable 
bonds. 
A second effect, which we label the “pension put”  effect, is asso- 
ciated with the work of Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977). Briefly, the 
PBGC’s insurance of pension benefits gives the firm a put option-it 
can shed its pension liabilities by  giving the PBGC the assets in the 
pension plan plus 30% of  the market value of  its net worth. As with 
any option, the value of this put increases with the risk of the underlying 
asset. Thus, as long as the PBGC neither regulates pension fund risk 
nor accelerates its own claim at the first sign of financial distress, the 
firm has an incentive to undermine the PBGC’s claim. It can do so and 
maximize the value of  its put option by funding its pension plan only 
to the minimum permissible extent and investing the pension assets in 
the riskiest possible securities. These are, of course, the exact opposite 
policies from those suggested by the tax effects described above. 
It is possible to combine these two effects, the tax effect and the 
PBGC put, in  a joint model, as discussed by  Harrison  and Sharpe 
(1983),  Bulow (1983), Chen (1983), and Westerfield and Marshall (1983). 
Thus the firm can be viewed as facing a trade-off-by  overfunding and 
investing in bonds it maximizes tax benefits, but by underfunding and 
investing in  risky assets it maximizes the value of  the pension  put. 
However, it can be shown that this trade-off does not produce a set of 
unique interior optimal policies, but rather implies that each firm should 
be following one of two very different extreme policies. If the firm is 
profitable and relatively safe, the pension put will probably have neg- 
ligible value.  Hence the firm should fully fund its pension  plan  and 
invest entirely in the most heavily taxed securities. On the other hand, 
if  the firm is both unprofitable and risky, the tax shelter may be su- 
perfluous,  and the  pension  put  may  be  quite valuable.  In  order to 
maximize its value, the firm should underfund its plan to the greatest 
extent possible and invest entirely in the riskiest securities. 
A third effect, which we label the “financial slack” effect, has em- 
phasized the pension fund’s usefulness as a source of corporate liquidity 
or as a store of temporarily excess corporate funds. The view that firms 
will maintain some financial slack has a long informal history based on 
the notion that they do not wish to be caught having to rely on external 
financing at “unfavorable”  times. A more formal version of this idea 
has recently been developed by  Myers and Majluf (1983), who posit 
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prospects  than outside investors.  In that event, there is an adverse 
selection problem,  since managers  have an incentive to issue more 
stock when they believe that it is overpriced, and consequently, inves- 
tors will react negatively to news of a stock issue. Managers therefore 
maintain some financial slack in order to avoid the necessity of a stock 
issue. 
Such slack could be kept in the form of either liquid assets and unused 
debt capacity or pension assets. The latter is advantageous from a tax 
standpoint, but liquid assets and unused debt capacity are presumably 
substantially more accessible, particularly in the short run. While firms 
have increasingly attempted to tap their excess pension assets in recent 
years (Hawthorne 1983; Louis 1983; Smith 1983), the legality and reg- 
ulatory status of these attempts has yet to be clearly defined. One might 
therefore expect firms to trade tax benefits against accessibility in de- 
ciding how much of their financial slack to keep in the pension fund. 
As Tepper (1983) has shown, this can, in principle at least, lead to an 
interior optimum with partial funding. The stronger are a firm’s earnings 
and the greater its need for tax shelter, the greater will be its tendency 
to build financial slack in the form of  additional pension  assets, and 
vice versa. 
Together, these different aspects of corporate pensions (the tax shel- 
ter, the PBGC put, and the accessibility of financial slack) form what 
we shall call a corporate financial perspective on pension policy. 
2.2.3  Distinguishing among the Perspectives 
The two perspectives discussed above are not, of course, mutually 
exclusive theories or prescriptions for pension fund policies. The tra- 
ditional perspective emphasizes the separate and  segregated  role of 
pension funds and their relationship to the beneficiaries’ interests. The 
corporate financial perspective emphasizes instead the integral role of 
pension decisions in overall corporate financial policy and its relation- 
ship to the shareholders’ interests. Clearly, both sets of interests could 
be determinants of actual corporate pension decisions. 
In addition, it is difficult to develop meaningful empirical tests that 
would distinguish clearly between the two different perspectives. We 
can, however, make some generalizations in that regard. Suppose, for 
example, that our cross-sectional tests reveal that companies’ pension 
funding seems to be importantly determined by variables describing 
the companies’ past and present financial condition and/or their tax- 
paying status. We  would interpret this as evidence that funding was 
being determined in part by the corporate financial perspective, par- 
ticularly if a stronger financial condition and tax-paying status appeared 
to be associated with greater funding. If, on the other hand, the degree 
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(or if  weaker financial companies actually funded more), we  would 
interpret this as evidence that funding was being determined by  the 
interests of  beneficiaries, as in the traditional perspective on pension 
decisions. 
Distinguishing between the two perspectives on the basis of empirical 
tests of asset allocation is more difficult, particularly because it is not 
at all clear what asset allocation policy or sets of  policies would be 
consistent with our traditional perspective.  Roughly speaking, if  the 
observed frequency distribution of asset allocation across firms is quite 
bimodal with most firms at one extreme or another, we would interpret 
this as evidence that the corporate financial perspective is driving asset 
allocation decisions. In addition, if  risky firms with underfunded plans 
tend to invest in stocks and safe firms with overfunded plans in bonds, 
we would interpret this as evidence that the corporate financial per- 
spective was  influencing asset allocation  decisions.  We  will  discuss 
these alternative interpretations in more detail in  section 2.5. 
2.3  Existing Evidence 
Before proceeding to our own empirical work, it is useful to review 
the small body of evidence on corporate pensions that currently exists. 
Friedman (1983) has conducted the most extensive empirical study to 
date, using IRS Form 5500 data for a broad sample of  firms for the 
year 1977. This source provides data on pension funding and pension 
asset allocation for the firms in the sample, and Friedman supplemented 
it with finanical data from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat tape. 
One of the primary questions that Friedman addressed was whether 
corporate pension plans can be viewed as an integral part of the overall 
corporate financing decision. In the terminology of section 2.2 above, 
he looked for evidence that the corporate financial perspective is an 
appropriate one from which to view pension decisions. Accordingly, 
he estimated a number of relationships of the following form: on the 
left-hand  side of  the equation appeared  some aspect of  the pension 
decision such as unfunded liabilities or the proportion of pension assets 
invested in bonds; on the right-hand side appeared some measure of 
conventional financing, such as ordinary balance sheet liabilities, plus 
one other control variable. Among the control variables used were a 
number of measures of firm profitability, risk, and tax-paying status. 
Friedman concluded  that pension  decisions are indeed related to 
other aspects of the corporate financing decision. He found that un- 
funded pension liabilities and the proportion of pension assets invested 
in bonds are both positively related to ordinary balance sheet liabilities. 
He also found that a reverse relationship  holds, with balance sheet 
leverage depending positively on unfunded pension liabilities, regard- 
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Such interrelationships would be predicted by the corporate financial 
perspective. From that perspective, the channels through which pen- 
sion fund decisions affect firm value are also conditioned by the overall 
financing decision. Balance sheet leverage affects the firm’s tax-paying 
status, the risk borne by both the PBGC and the firm’s employees, and 
the firm’s available borrowing power. Hence the pension and capital 
structure decisions are tied to the same set of underlying factors. Viewed 
from the corporate financial perspective,  the results that  we report 
below, therefore, concerning the linkages between pension decisions 
and the firm’s tax-paying status, profitability, and risk, should be thought 
of as reduced-form relationships from a larger system. 
While there is some evidence of the related nature of  pension and 
other financing decisions in Friedman’s results, the picture becomes 
clouded  when we attempt to identify different  effects. The positive 
relationship between unfunded  pension liabilities and ordinary debt, 
for example, suggests that whatever financial risk firms assume through 
their pension funds is magnified by their financing decisions. This could 
be interpreted as an indication that firms with unfunded pension lia- 
bilities try to maximize the value of the pension put through balance 
sheet leverage. However, Friedman’s asset allocation results appear 
to contradict this conclusion. There, greater balance sheet leverage 
seems to be offset by more conservative investment of pension assets. 
The picture that emerges from Friedman’s control variables is also 
clouded. Higher risk, as measured by earnings variability, is associated 
with pension investment strategies that are more heavily weighted to- 
ward bonds. This is consistent with the relationship between leverage 
and pension asset allocation and could be interpreted as evidence that 
pension portfolios are managed to protect the beneficiaries, as predicted 
by the traditional perspective. However, Friedman also found a positive 
relationship between firm profitability and unfunded pension liabilities, 
which is hard to reconcile with the traditional perspective. In addition, 
he could find no relationship between firms’ tax-paying status and either 
their funding or pension  investment decisions. Overall, then, Fried- 
man’s results do not strongly favor one perspective to the exclusion 
of the other and indeed convey the feeling that corporate pension de- 
cisions are not well understood. 
The only other extensive empirical work on the subject that we are 
aware of  is by Westerfield and Marshall (1983). Using quarterly SEC 
data for approximately 400 corporations  over the period  from  1972 
through  1977, they studied pension asset allocation. They could not 
attribute any significant change in asset allocation to passage of  the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in September of 
1974, nor could they find a significant link between the asset mix and 
the variability of the PBGC’s claim on the firm. They did find that the 
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to unfunded liabilities in the post-ERISA period, which is consistent 
with the pension put effect. However, this relationship was not statis- 
tically significant. 
In summary, existing results do not clearly identify the appropriate 
perspective from which to view corporate pension decisions. Never- 
theless, other avenues of  inquiry have yet to be explored. There are 
additional sources of data that can be examined, and the data can also 
be adjusted in different ways. One such adjustment concerns the dis- 
cretion that firms currently have to choose a discount rate for reporting 
their pension liabilities. 
2.4  The Choice of a Discount Rate for Reporting Pension Liabilities 
Suppose, as current theory suggests, that there is a relationship be- 
tween firms’ financial condition and their optimal funding decisions. In 
order to report the funding levels they have chosen, firms must select 
discount rates pursuant to Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Rules 35 and 36. But suppose further that they choose these rates in 
a manner that varies systematically  with their financial condition. If 
empirical work is conducted using reported funding measures, the true 
cross-sectional relationship between financial condition and uniformly 
calculated measures of funding status could be obscured. 
Firms must choose a discount rate for both funding purposes and 
reporting purposes, and there is reason to believe that both of these 
rates may vary inversely with firm profitability. Changes in the rate 
used for funding purposes may allow the firm to loosen the Internal 
Revenue Service’s constraint on maximum funding. A decrease in the 
assumed rate, for example, increases the pension liability measure and 
allows further funding to take place. The IRS would presumably impose 
limits on this practice, but it is clear that it is not forbidden altogether. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to trace this effect empirically, since 
the rates used for funding purposes and for FASB 35 and 36 reporting 
purposes may differ and data are available only for the latter rates. To 
the extent that the two rates are correlated, however, as they seem to 
be, reductions in reported rates may reflect reductions in funding rates 
that are made to achieve tax savings. 
At the opposite end of the funding spectrum, increases in assumed 
discount rates will reduce reported pension  liabilities, and this may 
allow firms to loosen the Department of Labor’s constraint on under- 
funding. Such an effect, of course, depends on the presumption that 
the DOL either is deceived by or reacts passively  to these discount 
rate changes. 
Firms may also wish to change their assumed discount rates in order 
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By altering the discount rate chosen for funding purposes, a firm can 
effectively smooth its reported earnings over time, a practice that was 
evident in Friedman’s (1983) empirical results. Furthermore, by altering 
the discount rate chosen for reporting purposes, a firm can attempt to 
obscure its management over time of financial slack, reported earnings 
per share, and/or the value of its unfunded liabilities. It might hope, 
for example, to obscure this process from investors who might oth- 
erwise interpret reduced funding as negative information on the firm’s 
current or prospective financial condition. It might also hope to obscure 
this process from employees, for example, to limit labor unions’ efforts 
to bargain for the financial slack being held in the form of overfuading. 
Whether changes in the discount rate are aimed at real funding con- 
straints, or simply at investors’ and/or employees’ perceptions of the 
firm, we might expect an inverse relationship between the rate chosen 
and the firm’s profitability. When earnings are strong, the firm might 
want to build up financial slack without making that fact too obvious, 
so there should be a tendency to choose lower discount rates. When 
earnings are weak, the reverse might be true. In the empirical work 
that follows, we test this proposition and also adjust reported pension 
liabilities to a common  discount rate to correct for any  systematic 
biases. 
2.5  Empirical Tests 
2.5.1  The Data 
The aim of our empirical work was to seek regularities in the funding 
and asset allocation of pension plans across a broad spectrum of U.S. 
corporations. In particular, we wanted to see if pension fund decisions 
were related to various measures of firms’ financial condition, as sug- 
gested by the corporate financial perspective. Thus we were looking 
for significant relationships  between  firms’ funding levels and their 
profitability, tax-paying status, and risk, as well as between their al- 
location of pension assets and their risk. It was our hope that this would 
allow us to assess not only the plausibility of the corporate financial 
perspective as a whole but also the strength of the tax, pension put, 
and financial slack effects. 
The first group of variables for which we needed data consisted of 
pension fund characteristics for a sample of  firms. We  chose to take 
the bulk of these data from FASB Statement 36  filings for the year 
1980. Figures  were available for 939 corporations, ensuring a fairly 
broad  cross-section, and, of  particular importance for our purposes, 
this source included data on the interest rate assumptions used by these 
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To  measure the levels of pension funding for these firms, we first 
took reported pension liabilities and adjusted them to a common dis- 
count rate to correct for any systematic tendencies toward over- or 
underreporting. We  chose 10% for our common rate, since this was 
approximately the rate used by the PBGC around this time to value 
the liabilities of  terminated plans  (Munnell 1982). In the absence of 
detailed information on the time profile of different firms’ pension li- 
abilities,  we made the adjustment simply by multiplying each firm’s 
reported liabilities by the ratio of the assumed discount rate to 10%. 
We used two measures of pension liabilities, adjusting both in the same 
manner. These were the present value of vested pension benefits and 
total accrued (that is, vested plus unvested) benefits. We  then divided 
total pension assets (reported in the FASB 36 filings) by each of these 
liability measures to arrive at two measures of  the level of pension 
funding. 
The FASB 36 data did not include a breakdown of pension assets by 
security type. We were able to obtain asset allocation data from Green- 
wich Research Associates for a sample of  firms, 369 of  which over- 
lapped with our FASB 36 sample. As our measure of asset allocation 
we used the proportion of total pension assets invested in fixed income 
securities, which include cash and short-term investments, bonds, guar- 
anteed investment contracts, and insured pension plans2  We  also ob- 
tained Greenwich data on the proportion of pension plan participants 
already  retired for each firm. Under the traditional  perspective,  the 
allocation of  pension assets might be affected by demographic char- 
acteristics of the participant pool, and we wished to test this possibility. 
The second  type of  variable  for which we  needed  data was  firm 
profitability. We  chose to measure this as 1980 inflation-adjusted return 
on net  assets, or inflation-adjusted  operating profits divided  by  the 
replacement cost of the firm’s assets. These inflation-adjusted data for 
1980 were available from FASB Statement 33 filings, but only for 508 
of the 939 firms in our original sample. 
The choice of  this profitability measure was dictated primarily by 
two considerations. First, if  we interpret our equations as reduced- 
form equations from a larger system, it is appropriate to consider the 
profitability measure that is driving the full system. Presumably  the 
overall financial structure decision is affected by real profitability rather 
than some profitability concept that is subject to inflationary distor- 
tions.  In addition,  the  reduced-form notion  suggests  that operating 
profit, which does not already reflect the firm’s leverage choice, is the 
most appropriate profitability mea~ure.~  Second, the financial slack 
effect would seem to depend on a real profitability measure. Inflationary 
distortions, such as those stemming from inventory profits or under- 
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financial slack. While the inflation-adjusted data have these advantages, 
however, one cost should also be noted. Ideally, several years worth 
of data might be used to smooth out short-run profitability fluctuations 
that may have little impact on the firm’s decisions. Unfortunately the 
FASB 33 data are not available for years prior to 1979. 
The third type of data we needed was measures of tax-paying status. 
The chief difficulty here is that taxes reported on firms’ financial state- 
ments may differ markedly from the taxes they actually pay. However, 
only the reported figures are available, since the IRS does not disclose 
actual payments on a disaggregated basis. We  decided to try two, ad- 
mittedly imperfect, measures. 
The first of  these is the firm’s tax loss carry-forward (divided by 
inflation-adjusted assets as a scaling factor). This variable is reported 
on the Standard and Poor’s Compustat tape for 502 of the firms in our 
original sample, and it reflects their actual ability to make use of ad- 
ditional tax shields. The larger is the size of the carry-forward, the less 
likely is the firm to be in a tax-paying position in the immediate future, 
and hence the less valuable is the tax advantage from pension funding. 
A second measure of tax-paying status is the firm’s total reported 
taxes minus the change in deferred taxes over the previous year (again, 
scaled by  inflation-adjusted  asset^).^  Substracting the change in de- 
ferred tax liabilities provides an approximate adjustment for such prac- 
tices as using straight-line depreciation for reporting purposes and ac- 
celerated depreciation for tax purposes. The data needed to construct 
this measure were also available on the Compustat tape, this time for 
490 of the firms in our original sample. 
The fourth variable that we needed to measure was risk. The same 
argument could be made here that we are really estimating a reduced- 
form relationship and that we are thus interested in an exogenous, or 
operating risk, measure. However, the value of the pension put option 
depends on the firm’s total risk, including financial as well as operating 
risk and unsystematic as well as systematic risk.  Since we were par- 
ticularly interested in trying to isolate any pension put effect that might 
exist, we chose as our primary risk measure the firm’s 1980 Standard 
and Poor’s bond rating. This reflects an assessment of risk based on a 
composite of historical data and future expectations. Data were col- 
lected for 457 of our firms, and the ratings were coded from  1  to 10, 
with lower numbers representing lower ratings and presumably greater 
risk. 
Since risk is a notoriously difficult concept to measure we also tried 
three other risk variables.  The first of  these is the firm’s unlevered 
beta, which reflects the systematic risk  of  its  assets.  Levered  beta 
estimates were collected for 439 of our firms from data provided by 
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debt/equity ratios.s The value  of  common  stock was obtained from 
stock market data, while the market value of preferred stock was es- 
timated by capitalizing each firm’s preferred dividends for 1980 at the 
Standard and Poor’s preferred dividend yield. The market value of debt 
was estimated using the current Baa bond rate.6  An alternative measure 
of  operating risk can be based on total, rather than systematic, vari- 
ability. For this, we used a standard deviation of detrended return on 
net assets over a 10-year period. Since we did not have inflation-adjusted 
data for such a lengthy period, it was necessary to use book figures 
from the Compustat tape to measure this  variable. In addition, the 
requirement of  10 consecutive years of data reduced the available sub- 
sample for this variable to 221 firms. Our final risk  measure, which 
reflects financial as well as operating risk, is the standard deviation of 
monthly returns on the firm’s stock, computed over the period of Jan- 
uary  1979-December  1980. Data were available from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices for 506 of our firms. 
The names and definitions of all of these variables are listed in table 
2.1. We  also show some summary statistics for the different variables 
to indicate the range of values represented in our sample. We  turn now 
to our estimation. 
Table 2.1  Summary Characteristics of  the Data 
Sample Size 
Standard  Minimum  Maximum  for this 
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NOTE:  PA  =  Reported pension assets; TPL =  Total  pension  liabilities, adjusted to 
common 10% discount rate; VPL = Vested pension liabilities, adjusted to common 10% 
discount rate; R = Discount rate assumed by firm in reporting pension liabilities; FI = 
Fraction of  pension assets invested in fixed income securities; PRET = Percentage of 
pension plan participants who have already retired; A = Nonpension corporate assets, 
valued at replacement cost; RONA = Inflation-adjusted return on net assets (inflation- 
adjusted operating earnings divided by A); CFWD = End-of-year magnitude of tax loss 
carry-forwards; T = Reported total taxes minus the change during 1980 in deferred tax 
liabilities; BETAU = Unlevered beta; SDRONA = Standard deviation around trend of 
book return on net assets; BRAT  = Standard & Poor’s Bond Rating (10 = AAA,  I  = 
D); SDMR = Standard deviation of market return on firm’s stock. 27  Funding and Asset Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans 
2.5.2  The Assumed Discount Rate 
The first hypothesis we  tested  concerns  the relationship between 
firm profitability and the discount rate chosen for reporting pension 
liabilities. A simple regression of the assumed discount rate against 
inflation-adjusted return on net assets, as reported in table 2.2,  indicates 
a strong negative correlation between the two variables. That is, more 
profitable firms tend to choose lower discount rates and thus, in relative 
terms, to overstate their pension liabilities. This result suggests that it 
may be important to adjust reported liabilities to a common basis if the 
true relationships between pension funding and other variables are to 
be uncovered. 
We  also tested  the  constancy  of  the relationship between  R and 
RONA. In particular, as the value of  the put to the PBGC increases, 
one might expect firms to increase their assumed values of  R at an 
even faster rate  in order to conceal the PBGC’s true exposure. To 
examine this possibility, we created a dummy variable, PBGC, which 
takes on a value of one if the pension put is “in the money” and zero 
otherwise. The pension put is deemed to be in the money if  a firm’s 
unfunded  vested  pension  liabilities,  calculated  at reported  discount 
rates, exceed 30% of the firm’s market value of equity. The results of 
this experiment are also reported in table 2.2. The dummy variable has 
a significant coefficient, and the effect is in the hypothesized direction: 










t  = 100.0 
-0.025 
(.007) 
t  =  -3.6 
0.07 
(.0007) 
t  = 100.0 
-0.017 
(.007) 
t  =  -2.4 
0.017 
(.006) 
t = 2.8 
R’  .02  .05 
No. of 
observations 
515  515 
aStandard errors and r-statistics in these and other regressions have been corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) procedure. 
bPBGC =  1 if vested pension liabilities, valued at reported discount rate, exceed 30% 
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companies that have the PBGC in the riskiest position tend to increase 
their assumed discount rates by even greater amounts than other firms. 
2.5.3  Pension Funding 
Next, we investigated the relationship between pension funding (cal- 
culated on a uniform basis) and profitability, tax-paying  status, and 
risk. As a preliminary step, we computed the simple correlation coef- 
ficients reported in table 2.3. The limitations of this measure are well 
known. However, it does allow us to examine relationships between 
the variables using as much of  our sample as possible, in contrast to 
the regression analysis, in which data requirements forced considerable 
cuts in sample size. 
One of  the stronger results in the table is the positive correlation 
between funding and RONA.  This is consistent  with  the corporate 
financial perspective under which pension decisions are related to firm 
profitability. Also of note is the strong negative correlation between 
funding and the percentage of plan participants retired. As mentioned 
in section 2.4.1, we collected data on this variable with an eye toward 
Table 2.3  Simple Correlations between Funding and Explanatory Variables 
T  -  -  PA  CFWD 
VPL  RONA  A  A  BRAT 
(Vested  (Profit-  PRET  (Carry-  (Taxes  (Bond 













,868  .203  -  .238 
II = .oooi  n = .OOOI  n = .WOI 
N = 908  N = 492  N = 297 
,192  -  ,331 
N  = 492  N  = 297 
n = .oooi  n = .oooi 
-  ,359 
n = .0001 
N  =  195 
-  ,104 
n = 420 
N = 502 
-  .096 
n = ,032 
N = 502 
-  .I23 
n = .006 
N = 492 
.ox9 
N =  199 
rI  = .792 
.I97  ,123 
n = .oooi  11 = .oo9 
N = 490  N = 457 
,184  .ow 
n = .0001  II =  ,056 
N  = 490  N = 457 
,693  ,173 
Il  = .0001  KI = ,007 
N = 458  N  = 240 
-  ,180  ,085 
I1 = ,013  I1  = .251 
N =  191  N =  183 
-  ,076  -  ,151 
n = ,101  n = ,018 
N = 467  N = 247 
.29h 
I1  = .0001 
N  = 243 
NOTE:  TI  = Probability of  finding a sample correlation greater than that reported under the 
null hypotheses that the true correlation is zero. N = Number of observations used in computing 
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its possible influence on asset allocation, and thus its strong correlation 
with pension funding came as a surprise. We  believe, as will be dis- 
cussed in further detail below, that this variable is serving as a proxy 
for the firm’s long-run profitability. 
Pension funding also appears to be strongly related to tax-paying 
status, particularly the T/A variable. The results for both CFWD/A and 
T/A are in the directions predicted by the tax and financial slack effects: 
that is, heavier tax burdens are associated with higher funding levels. 
Finally, the bond rating variable is positively correlated with funding, 
which is consistent with the pension put effect.  Riskier firms, as in- 
dicated by  lower bond ratings, tend to exhibit lower funding levels. 
Correlations among the different risk measures are shown in table 2.4, 
and in general all four measures tend in the same direction (low values 
of  BRAT  denote higher risk,  and thus  BRAT  should  be negatively 
correlated with the alternative measures). The relation between bond 
rating and unlevered beta, however, is quite weak. 
With an eye toward multicollinearity problems in the regression anal- 
ysis, it  is also worth noting in table 2.3 the correlations among the 
explanatory variables. As might be expected, RONA is related to both 
bond rating and the measures of  tax-paying status, while bond rating 
and tax-paying status are in turn related to one another. These rela- 
tionships suggest that it may be difficult to separate the different effects 
on funding. 
We  next regressed the level of pension funding against profitability, 
tax-paying status, and risk. The results when funding is measured as 
pension assets over vested pension liabilities are reported in table 2.5. 
Table 2.4  Correlation Matrix of  Risk Measures 
BETAU  SDRONA  SDMR 
(Unlevered  (S. D.  (S.D. 
Beta)  Book Return)  Mkt. Return) 
BRAT  -  .048  -  .347  -  ,254 
(bond  n = .477  n = .0001  n = ,003 
rating)  N = 224  N  = 260  N =  140 
BETAU 
SDRONA 
,176  ,198 
I1  = ,0006  n = ,003 
N = 382  N = 224 
,266 
n = .oO01 
N = 206 
NOTE:  II = Probability of finding a sample correlation greater than that reported under 
the null hypotheses that the true correlation is zero. N  = Number of  observations used 
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Table 2.5  Pension Funding Regressions 
Equation 
Independent 




















t  = 8.0 
1.704 
(0.481) 
t  = 3.5 
~  0.504 
(0.514) 
t=  -1.0 
0.020 
(0.020) 





t =  19.8 
1.739 
(0.348) 
t  = 5.0 
-  1.635 
(0.938) 
t =  -1.7 
0.097 
(0.064) 





t  = 7.5 
1.323 
(0.554) 
t  = 2.4 
1.177 
(0.767) 
t = 1.5 
0.016 
(0.022) 





t  = 20.1 
1.i14 
(0.523) 
I  = 3.3 
0.370 
(0.662) 
t  = 0.6 
0.100 
(0.064) 
t  =  1.6 
.08 
338 
NOTE:  Dependent variable  = PA/VPL (vested funding). Numbers in  parentheses are 
standard errors, calculated according to White (1980). 
We  obtained very similar results when funding was measured in terms 
of total accrued liabilities, and these results are not reported.  Both 
measures of tax-paying status are used in table 2.5, and risk is measured 
in  terms of  both bond rating and unlevered beta.  The results using 
SDRONA and SDMR were qualitatively similar and are not reported. 
The strongest effect that emerges in table 2.5 is that of profitability. 
Inflation-adjusted return  on net  assets has  a uniformly positive  and 
significant association with the level of  pension funding. This is con- 
sistent with the corporate financial perspective on pension decisions, 
and the direction of  the effect is simultaneously  consistent with the 
tax, pension put, and financial slack effects. 
This finding is also in contrast to Friedman’s (1983) results, which 
showed a negative relationship between profitability and funding. As 
discussed  in  section 2.3,  Friedman  used  a different  data  source, a 31  Funding and Asset Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans 
different year, reported instead of uniformly calculated measures of 
pension liabilities and a different specification, so it is difficult to at- 
tribute the difference in results to any one factor. We  did, however, 
run the same regressions using reported pension liabilities to calculate 
our funding measures, and we found that the positive relationship per- 
sisted between funding and pr~fitability.~ 
The tax effect in table 2.5 is consistently in the direction predicted 
by both the tax arbitrage and financial slack theories, but its statistical 
significance is generally much lower than that of the profitability effect. 
Whether tax-paying status is measured in terms of carry-forwards or 
reported tax payments adjusted for the change in deferred tax liabilities, 
an increase in the tax burden is associated with an increase in funding. 
In view of the correlations between profitability and tax-paying status 
reported in table 2.3, it is not surprising that the tax effect is difficult 
to distinguish. 
Finally, the effect of risk  in table 2.5 is neither consistent across 
equations nor very significant statistically. When risk is measured by 
bond rating, greater risk is associated with less funding, consistent with 
the pension put effect. When risk is measured by unlevered beta, on 
the other hand, higher risk is associated with higher funding levels. 
Since neither of these effects is statistically significant, no clear picture 
emerges of the true influence of risk on pension funding. 
Perhaps, however, it is unreasonable to expect the pension put and 
tax effects to leave strong traces across the entire sample of firms. As 
pointed out in section 2.2.2, for example, the influence of risk on the 
value of the pension put might be expected to appear strongly only for 
the riskiest firms. To examine this possibility, we split our sample and 
performed the same regression for those firms whose bond rating was 
below average relative to the sample as a whole. This regression, using 
T/A as the tax variable, is reported in the first column of  table 2.6. 
Lower bond ratings (higher risk) are still associated with lower funding 
levels, this time in a more significant fashion. To the extent that there 
is an identifiable pension put effect, it appears to be very nonlinear, as 
theory would suggest. The fact that the explanatory power of the equa- 
tion increases substantially relative to the full sample regression also 
indicates that the effects we are seeking to identify do not fall along a 
single straight line for a broad cross-section of firms.8 
In the same vein, we split our sample by values of T/A to see if the 
tax effect would make a stronger showing among firms facing the heav- 
iest  tax  burdens.  Results from the same regression  performed  over 
those firms having above-average  values of T/A are reported  in the 
second column of table 2.6. For this subsample, the estimated coeffi- 
cient of  T/A is quite large and more statistically significant than those 
reported in table 2.5. 32  Zvi Bodie, Jay 0. Light, Randall Mgrck, and Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
Table 2.6  Pension Funding Regressions for Subsamples 
Subsample: Firms  Subsample: Firms 
Independent  with Below-Average  with 















t  = 2.0 
1.221 
(0.684) 
f  = 1.8 
1.792 
(1.277) 
t  = 1.4 
0.122 
(0.061) 




(0.29  1) 
f  = 3.6 
0.359 
(1.004) 
t  = 0.4 
2.925 
(1.367) 
f  = 2.1 
0.031 
(0.032) 
t  = 1.0 
.07 
81 
NOTE:  Dependent variable  = PAIVPL (vested funding). Numbers  in parentheses are 
standard errors calculated according to White (1980). 
Looking at tables 2.5 and 2.6 together, the profitability variable ap- 
pears to be doing most of the work in the full sample regression. The 
tax  and  risk  variable  have relatively  insignificant effects.  However, 
when the sample is split into pieces, these latter effects show up more 
strongly among firms that deviate from the average. The pension put 
effect appears to have some plausibility for the high-risk subsample, 
while the tax effect is more pronounced for the high tax-paying sub- 
sample. In addition, the effect of profitability is attenuated in  these 
subsamples. It may be that profitability is simply a proxy  for some 
combination  of  tax  and risk  effects  that best explains variations in 
funding for the sample as a whole. At the edges of the sample, however, 
where the tax and risk effects become separated, the explanatory power 
of  profitability declines, and the tax and risk effects are more readily 
identifiable. 
The suspicion that our RONA measure of profitability may be acting 
as a proxy for other variables receives further support when we add 
PRET, the percentage of plan participants retired, to our list of  ex- 
planatory variables. The results of this experiment (performed over the 
largest sample of firms for which data on all the variables was available) 
are reported in table 2.7. Comparing these results with equation (3) in 33  Funding and Asset Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans 
table  2.5, we  see that  the estimated coefficients of  T/A and BRAT 
remain very similar in size and significance. However, in the presence 
of PRET, the effect of RONA virtually disappears. At the same time 
the explanatory power of the equation triples (although the sample size 
is cut in half). 
Taken together, then, the smaller-sample results of tables 2.6 and 2.7 
convey the strong impression that RONA is a very noisy measure of 
firms’ financial condition. In addition, the results in table 2.7 raise the 
question of how PRET’s apparently strong effect should be interpreted. 
Our feeling is that this variable is a measure of firm or industry life 
cycle and hence of long-run financial condition. Firms with the highest 
ratios of retired to active workers are most likely to be in a phase of 
maturity or even decline. They are likely to exhibit slower growth and 
lower profitability than other firms, and thus the finding that higher 
values of PRET are associated with lower levels of  pension funding is 
consistent with the corporate financial per~pective.~ 
The results thus far suggest that the corporate financial perspective 
is a plausible one from which to view pension funding decisions. A 
Table 2.7  Percentage of Plan Participants Retired as a Determinant of 
Pension Funding 
Independent  Dependent Variable: 
Variables  PANPL (Vested Funding) 
Constant  1.685 
(0.334) 
t  = 5.0 
RONA  0.016 
(profitability)  (0.893) 
2  = 0.02 
PRET  -  1.980 
(% retired)  (0.626) 
t  =  -3.2 
T  1.190 
A  (1.030) 
- 
(taxes paid)  t  = 1.2 
BRAT  0.018 
(bond rating)  (0.036) 
f  = 0.5 
R?  .17 
No. of  108 
observations 
NOTE:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors calculated according to White (1980). 34  Zvi Bodie, Jay 0.  Light, Randall Merck, and Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
potential weakness of the tests conducted, however, is that pension 
variables have been measured on a firmwide basis, whereas many firms 
administer more than one plan. It is possible that different perspectives 
should be applied in analyzing the funding levels of different pension 
plans within the same firm. 
For example,  one of  the  rationales offered  in  section 2.2 for the 
corporate financial perspective was that promised benefits are insured 
by the PBGC and thus firms need not feel constrained to adopt funding 
levels that the beneficiaries would prefer in the absence of insurance. 
In fact, however, the extent of  the insurance coverage is limited.'O 
Different pension plans within the same firm, then, might be funded 
differently depending on the degrees of insurance coverage for their 
respective participants. Plans for hourly workers, who are more likely 
to have complete insurance coverage, might be managed from a cor- 
porate financial perspective. On the other hand, plans for salaried work- 
ers, who are more likely to have promised benefits in excess of insur- 
ance limits, might be managed from the traditional perspective. 
To perform a rough examination of this possibility, we obtained fund- 
ing data on over 10,000 different pension plans (each with more than 
100 participants) from the IRS Form 5500 for 1980.11  For each plan, 
we had data on pension assets, the present value of vested benefits, 
and the discount rate assumption, so we were able to compute vested 
funding (PA/VPL), where total pension liabilities have been adjusted 
to a 10% discount rate as in  the company-wide data above. Unfortu- 
nately, it was not possible to determine with complete accuracy whether 
a given plan was for hourly workers, salaried workers, or both. Rather, 
the plans had been grouped into four mutually exclusive categories, 
corresponding to the formula used in calculating benefits. The first of 
these is the fixed benefit plans which pay a fixed percentage of  final 
compensation. The second is  the unit benefit plans which pay  some 
percentage of  final  compensation times  years  of  service. The third 
category is the  flat benefit plans,  which  simply pay  a  stated  dollar 
amount, while the fourth category consists of all other plans. 
A  simple test for differences in funding behavior  is an analysis of 
variance, which tests for differences in  mean funding across the four 
categories. This test is reported in the form of a dummy variable regres- 
sion in table 2.8. The F-statistic value overwhelmingly rejects the hy- 
pothesis that there are no significant differences in funding across plan 
types.  In  addition, flat  benefit  plans  appear to be  significantly less 
funded than other types of plans. While not all hourly workers' plans 
are flat benefit plans, it is our understanding that flat benefit plans have 
hourly workers as their predominant participants. Thus there is some 
evidence that plans for workers whose benefits are more likely to be 
fully insured also tend to be less well funded on the average. This in 
turn  suggests that  whether the traditional  or the corporate financial 35  Funding and Asset Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans 
Table 2.8  Differences in Funding by  Plan Type 
Estimated 
Independent  Coefficient 











t = 39.8 
0.106 
(0.053) 
t = 2.0 
0.025 
(0.046) 
t  = 0.5 
-  0.335 
(0.055) 




NOTE:  Dependent variable  = PNVPL (vested funding). 
"FIXED = 1 if fixed benefit plan, 0 otherwise; UNIT = 1 if unit benefit plan, 0 otherwise; 
FLAT =  1 if flat benefit plan, 0 otherwise. 
perspective is a more accurate description of pension decisions may 
vary  by  type of  plan.  Further  investigation  of  this issue  would  be 
worthwhile if a more accurate breakdown of plans by type of participant 
could be obtained. 
2.5.4  Pension Asset Allocation 
Finally, we investigated  the asset allocation among our sample of 
corporate pension funds and its dependence upon various character- 
istics of the firm and the pension plan. 
Figure 2.1 shows the frequency distribution for our asset allocation 
variable, the percentage of pension fund assets invested in fixed income 
securities (FI), for all 539 firms for which data was available. Recall 
that the corporate financial perspective on asset allocation implies that 
pension funds should be invested at either one of two extremes. In 
particular, because the vast majority of the plans in this sample are 
considerably overfunded, this perspective implies that most funds should 
be invested entirely in fixed income securities (because these securities 
are presumably more heavily taxed). 
The data in figure 2.1 show that the distribution of  asset allocation 
across firms is, in fact, bimodal. On the one hand, these data do hint 
that firms divide into two groups, much as the corporate financial per- 36  Zvi Bodie, Jay 0.  Light, Randall M$rck, and Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
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Fig. 2.1  Frequency distribution  of  pension  portfolio allocation,  539 
firms. (Source: Greenwich Research  Associates data.) 
spective suggests they  should. And  10% do invest entirely in  fixed 
income, the extreme allocation that should be chosen by most firms.  l2 
Unfortunately, however, the remaining 90% hold decidedly mixed port- 
folios with a mode of 45% of  their pension  assets invested in  fixed 
income securities. These interior or nonextremal asset allocations can- 
not be explained by the corporate financial perspective on pension fund 
decisions. 
To glean some insight into the possible determinants of  asset allo- 
cation, we computed the correlation coefficients reported in table 2.9. 
To simplify and condense the presentation of our results in this section, 
we will report using only one measure of  funding, the ratio of assets 
to vested liabilities (PAIVPL); one measure of  risk, the bond  rating 
(BRAT); and one measure of tax status (T/A).I3  While, again, the prob- 
lems with simple correlation coefficients are well known, the values in 
table 2.9 are interesting.  Surprisingly, the asset  allocation  does not 
depend  upon  the  tax  variable  (TIA). Nor does it  depend  upon  the 
percentage of pension plan members who are retired (PRET),  our proxy 
for the demographics of the plan members and thus the shape of  the 
future pension liability stream. Equally surprising, the asset allocation 
does depend upon the dollar value of vested liabilities, our proxy for 
the size  of  the  company’s pension  plan and fund.14 Also,  the asset 
allocation appears to depend upon the degree of  funding (PAIVPL). 37  Funding and Asset Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans 
Table 2.9  Simple Correlations between Asset Allocation (FI) and 
Explanatory Variables 
PAIVPL  TIA  BRAT  VPL  PRET 
(Vested  (Taxes  (Bond  (Vested  (% 









,139  -  ,025  -  .lo7 
I1  = ,007  II  = ,700  II = ,119 
N = 369  N = 243  N = 215 
-.I36 
II = ,009 
N = 369 
-  .082 
II = .I60 
N = 292 
.I84  ,090 
n  = ,0001  II = ,056 
N = 490  N  = 457 
,296 
n = .0001 
N = 243 
-  ,096 
n = ,004 
N = 908 
-.I08 
n = ,017 
N = 490 
,162 
II = ,0005 
N  = 457 
-  .331 
I1  = ,0001 
N = 297 
-.180 
II = ,013 
N = 191 
.085 
Il = .251 
N = 183 
,091 
n  = ,118 
N  = 297 
NOTE:  II = Probability of  finding a sample correlation greater than that reported under 
the null hypotheses that the true population correlation is zero. N = Number of  obser- 
vations used. 
While  at first glance  the dependence  upon  size is  surprising, we 
believe it  can be explained  by an important difference between the 
implicit character of large and small pension plans. Other studies, par- 
ticularly Clark et al. (1983) and Greenwich Research Associates (1983), 
have shown that large defined benefit pension plans have given frequent 
and sizable post-retirement benefit increases to their participants.  It 
appears that large corporations tend to treat the “defined benefits”  of 
their pension plans as contractually stipulated minimums or floors for 
the benefits paid to retirees, but they voluntarily and regularly increase 
benefits beyond these floors.  To  some extent this may reflect their 
efforts to award real dollar as opposed to nominal dollar benefits to 
their retired employees. To  some extent it may reflect an attitude of 
sharing the surplus of pension assets (over liabilities) with retired em- 
ployees, as if their plans were more like defined contribution plans. In 
any case, though, the pension benefits of large corporations are clearly 
not fixed in practice in the nominal dollar terms that the legal language 
of most pension contracts would imply. 
The smaller pension  plans  associated  with  smaller companies,  in 
contrast, have only given very infrequent post-retirement benefit in- 
creases, and many of them have never given any increase. For example, 38  Zvi Bodie, Jay 0. Light, Randall M$rck,  and Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
in a typical year in the mid-1970s fewer than  10% of  the retirees of 
small pension plans received post-retirement increases, whereas more 
than three-quarters of the retirees of large plans received such increases 
(Clark el al. 1983). Apparently, small firms treat their pension claims 
much more as fixed nominal dollar liabilities of the corporation, as the 
corporate financial perspective on pensions assumes. We  believe that 
this may  well explain  why  small companies tend to invest a larger 
percentage of their pension funds in fixed income assets. 
Perhaps more important, the corporate financial perspective on pen- 
sion funds would  suggest that  asset allocation should be  related to 
funding and risk. For that small fraction of companies where the value 
of the PBGC put is appreciable, the plans should hold a larger fraction 
of their assets in stocks; otherwise they should invest in bonds. Com- 
panies with low bond ratings that are underfunded might thus be ex- 
pected to hold more stocks and less bonds, and vice versa. 
Table 2.10 reports some of  the regression results which attempt to 
explain asset allocation as a function of  these different variables. In 
equation (1) with two explanatory variables, funding has a statistically 
significant effect in  the hypothesized direction. That is, underfunded 
companies  do indeed hold fewer bonds.  Surprisingly, though, when 
bond rating is introduced as an independent variable in equations (2) 
Table 2.10  Asset Allocation Regressions (Full Sample) 
Equation 
Independent 














t  = 10.7 
-3.58 x  10-5 
(2.01 x  10-5) 
t  =  -1.8 
.064 
(.025) 





r  = 5.5 
,054 
(.035) 
t  =  1.5 
-  .()I87 
(.0117) 





f  = 5.4 
-2.25  X 
I =  -1.5 
(1.49  x  10-5) 
,051 
(.0351) 
t  =  1.5 
-  ,0151 
(.0119) 
t  =  -1.3 
.04 
215 
NOTE:  Dependent variable = FI (% invested in fixed income). Numbers in parentheses 
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and (3), it enters with a negative sign. Riskier companies hold fewer 
bonds and more stocks, the opposite of what we might expect if  com- 
panies were exploiting the PBGC put. This is the same dependence 
that Friedman (1983) found, a “risk-offsetting effect” between the asset 
mix of the pension fund and the risk of the company. 
Table 2.11 reports the results of a similar regression for that subsam- 
ple of 30 higher-risk firms whose bond ratings were BB + or lower. For 
this group of companies the PBGC put effect and its dependence upon 
funding might be more clearly observed. As the coefficients and R2 
demonstrate, funding (PANPL) is an even more important determinant 
of  asset allocation within this subsample, as we would expect.I5 The 
measures of statistical significance for both size and funding have an 
adjusted t-ratio of just about 2. 
Table 2.12 presents an alternative look at this same data. Confirming 
the results of table 2.11, among all higher-risk firms the underfunded 
plans hold riskier portfolios (fewer bonds and more stocks). Further- 
more, among all underfunded plans, the higher-risk firms own riskier 
portfolios.  In our entire sample there were actually only three firms 
that were credible candidates for having a valuable PBGC put in that 
they had both underfunded pension plans and a bond rating less than 
BBB -  .  Interestingly, these firms tended to hold rather risky portfolios, 
just as the corporate financial perspective suggests they should. 
The significance of these data are questionable, however, for both 
the obvious reason that three is not an overwhelming sample size and 
because of the subsequent history of these three firms. Upon looking 
Table 2.11  Asset Allocation Regressions for a Sample of Thirty Higher-Risk 
Firms with Bond Ratings of BB + or Lower 
Estimated 
Independent  Coefficient 
Variables  (Standard Error) 
Intercept  .272 
(. 188) 
t  =  1.4 
VPL  -1.74  x  10  5 
(vested liabilities)  (.89 x 
t =  -2.0 
PAIVPL  .214 
(.114) 
t  = 1.9 
R2  .I4 
No. of  30 
observations 
NOTE: Dependent Variable  = FI (% invested in fixed income) 40  Zvi Bodie, Jay 0.  Light, Randall MBrck, and Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
Table 2.12  Average Percentage of Plan Assets Invested in Fixed Income 
Securities for Different Regions of Funding and Bond Rating 
Funding 
Overfunded 
(PAITPL > 1.0) 
Underfunded 
(PAITPL < 1.0) 
Bond rating: 
BBB-  or above 
BB+ or below 
.48 
N  =  172 
.61 
N  = 27 
.50 
N  =  13 
.34 
N=3 
closely at these firms, we discovered that two of the three firms have 
subsequently switched their pension asset mixes to virtually 100% bonds 
using a bond dedication framework. Moreover, they did so in circum- 
stances in  which the probabilities  of  financial distress  were  clearly 
increasing not decreasing. Their subsequent asset mix decisions, then, 
were  quite inconsistent with  attempting to exploit the value of  the 
PBGC put. 
To summarize the empirical findings on asset allocation, there is an 
interesting dependence upon size which we believe can be explained 
by  the quite different ways in  which large and  small firms seem to 
regard their employees’ “defined benefits.”  In addition, underfunded 
plans tend to hold more equities and less fixed income securities. Fi- 
nally, we found some very sketchy evidence that the extreme subset 
of companies with both lower ratings and unfunded pension plans tend 
to hold more of their pension assets in equities, exactly what the cor- 
porate financial perspective on pension decisions would suggest. The 
subsequent history of these firms, however, makes us reluctant to con- 
clude we have found solid evidence of  such behavior. 
2.6  Conclusion 
When we look at our results in their entirety, we believe that we 
have found several pieces of evidence supporting the corporate financial 
perspective on pension fund decisions. There appears to be a real sense, 
then, in which corporations manage their pension funds as an integral 
part of  overall financial policy. 
First, the reporting of pension fund liabilities is systematically linked 
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profitable firms tend to choose lower discount rates and thus to report 
greater pension liabilities. Second, the level of pension funding is pos- 
itively related to companies’ long-run profitability. This may be a com- 
bined reflection of tax, risk, and financial slack effects. Third, a sig- 
nificant fraction of  firms invest their pension  assets entirely in fixed 
income securities, and the proportion of assets allocated to fixed income 
securities is positively related to the level of funding. 
However, the individual effects comprising the corporate financial 
perspective are more elusive. In our full sample of firms, the tax effect 
and the pension  put effect do not leave strong traces. Rather, these 
effects are more clearly discernible only at the edges of our sample: a 
significant positive relationship between tax-paying status and funding 
shows up among firms with the heaviest tax burdens; a negative rela- 
tionship between risk and funding shows up among the riskiest firms; 
and there is sketchy evidence of a tendency for the firms with the most 
valuable PBGC puts to invest their pension funds in riskier assets. 
Our results also indicate that the traditional and corporate financial 
perspectives  on pension  decisions are far from  mutually exclusive. 
Across firms, our asset allocation findings suggest that the corporate 
financial perspective may be more appropriate in describing small pen- 
sion plans, while larger plans appear to take on some of the charac- 
teristics of the traditional perspective. Moreover, even within the same 
firm, different plans may be more appropriately viewed from one per- 
spective or the  other depending on their level  of  PBGC  insurance 
coverage. 
Clearly, the present study represents only an initial attempt to gain 
a working empirical knowledge of  corporate pension funds. As more 
years  of  data become  available,  it  would be  desirable to check  the 
robustness of  our results across different periods and to examine the 
determinants of changes in pension funding and asset allocation over 
time. On the theoretical front, it is apparent that much remains to be 
understood about the underlying labor contracts of which pension plans 
are a part. A better understanding of the differences in these contracts 
across firms of  different size or across categories of  employees within 
the same firm may shed considerable further light on corporate pension 
decisions. 
Notes 
1.  Friedman  (1983)  discussed  the  potential difficulties resulting from the 
discount rate choice, but he did not have the data to  make any adjustments. 42  Zvi Bodie, Jay 0. Light, Randall M@rck,  and Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
2. The measure of pension assets in the denominator of this fraction is not 
the same as the figure for total pension assets in the FASB 36 filings. In mea- 
suring asset allocation we  deleted  “real estate investments”  and  “miscella- 
neous assets,” because it was not clear whether these were more like fixed 
income investments or more like common stock. The real estate category, for 
example, could include real property but could  also include mortgages.  We 
also deleted investments in the sponsoring company’s stock, since these might 
be  related  to factors other than the  desired  risk  and  return position  of  the 
pension portfolio. The denominator of  our asset allocation variable, then, is 
fixed income securities (as defined in the text) plus investments in the stock 
of other companies. 
3.  Unfortunately,  our earnings  measure  is not entirely purged  of leverage 
effects.  Our measure is equal to inflation-adjusted, after-tax net income plus 
interest payments. Without further data, we were unable to adjust taxes to the 
levels that would have been paid in the absence of  any debt. 
4. This measure of tax-paying status has been used by Zimmerman (in press). 
5. The adjustment  we used was to multiply  levered  betas by the ratio of 
preferred plus common stock to debt plus preferred plus common stock. This 
adjustment treats preferred stock as equity. We did not include corporate taxes 
in our adjustment, as would be consistent with a Miller (1977) model of capital 
structure equilibrium. 
6. More specifically, short-term liabilities (net of financial assets) were taken 
at book value.  The market value of long-term debt was estimated from the 
book  value  by  assuming a  10% average coupon rate and a 10-year average 
maturity. Estimated debt service payments were then discounted at the current 
Baa rate. This is similar to the procedure followed  in  Feldstein and Mdrck 
(1983). 
7. In  view of the relationship  between profitability  and assumed discount 
rates reported in table 2.2, it might have been argued that we induced a cor- 
relation  between  funding and RONA through  our adjustment to a common 
discount rate. The fact that the same correlation persists in the unadjusted data 
provides evidence against this argument. 
8. Even further sample splitting  may be justified.  When we  confined  our 
sample to firms whose bond  ratings were lower than  BBB-  (that is, lower 
than investment  grade), we obtained  an R2 of  .22 for a regression  using PA/ 
VPL as a dependent variable over a subsample of  32  firms. The estimated 
coefficient of BRAT in this regression was 0. I10 with a f-statistic of  2.5. 
9. PRET could of course be subject to alternative interpretations. One pos- 
siblity is that firms with greater proportions of  retired  workers simply have 
less flexibility to alter their actuarial assumptions and thus fewer possibilities 
for effectively overfunding their pension plans.  Since this interpretation im- 
plicitly rests on the notion that firms are managing their financial slack. it too 
is consistent with  the corporate financial  perspective. There may  be  other 
possible  interpretations of  PRET as well, but  it  is  difficult to see how  the 
findings in table 2.7 could be said to favor the traditional perspective over the 
corporate financial perspective. Although the traditional perspective might pre- 
dict that demographic characteristics of the participant pool are important to 
firms’ pension decisions, it is not clear under that view why greater proportions 
of retired workers should be associated with lower funding levels. 
10. As of  1982, vested pension benefits  were guaranteed  by the PBGC up 
to a maximum of $16,568 per year. 
11. We thank David Kennel1 of ICF, Inc., for his help in obtaining these data. 
12. We  did investigate  the character of the firms that invested  entirely  in 
fixed income. They tended to be somewhat smaller, somewhat safer (as mea- 43  Funding and Asset Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans 
sured by their unlevered  betas), and somewhat better funded, but they were 
not  extraordinarily  different from the full  sample of  firms  on any of  these 
dimensions. “Insured funds” accounted for 13.7% of their fixed income assets, 
as opposed to 9.2% of  the fixed income assets in the full sample. 
13. Other versions  of these same basic variables  were tested and yielded 
quite similar results, though often with less statistical significance. 
14. Other potential proxies for size (for example, the dollar value of pension 
assets) produce the same results, confirming that size really is the important 
thing being captured by this variable. 
15.  There is an alternative explanation for this dependence upon funding. 
Conversations with corporate financial officers in the field suggest that at least 
some of them may believe that underfunded plans should “reach” for greater 
expected returns, while overfunded plans, in contrast, should minimize risks 
and focus on preserving their capital. Indeed, several pension consulting firms 
recommend  such policies  explicitly  as part of  their overall asset allocation 
service. In more formal terms, such behavior would be consistent with a pref- 
erence or utility function for net pension wealth (assets minus liabilities) that 
is unusually  sharply bent around zero, a behavior analogous to some obser- 
vations of individual behavior in other quite different decision-making contexts. 
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COmment  Andre F.  Perold 
This empirical work is aimed at  uncovering relationships among on- 
balance-sheet corporate financial characteristics and off-balance-sheet 
levels of pension funding and asset mix. The study differs somewhat 
from a closely related earlier paper by Friedman (1983) in that it  is 
more clearly focused (e.g., by the choice of regression variables) on 
interpreting the data in the light of extant pension theory. The results 
involving pension funding are also more credible than Friedman’s since 
the pension liability data were taken from filings of FASB Statement 
36 instead of Form 5500. (FASB 36 imposes a uniform reporting stan- 
dard up to the choice of discount rate, which is also reported.) 
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I will comment first on certain problems associated with adjusting 
the reported liabilities to a common discount rate, and then critically 
examine some of the paper's findings. Before doing so, let me say that 
I am generally in agreement with the authors' interpretation of the data, 
with the obvious caveat that the findings of  any such cross-sectional 
study fixed in time (1980) should be treated with caution. 
2.C.1  Adjusting reported pension liabilities to a common 
discount rate 
Bodie et al. adjusted the pension liabilities to a common discount 
rate of 10% (the then-prevailing rate used by the PBGC) by multiplying 
the reported  pension  liability by  a factor of R/10% where R  is the 
reported discount rate.' This is an approximation and assumes that the 
accrued liability stream is a constant perpetuity.  Since we do not live 
forever, and since currently employed beneficiaries only begin to re- 
ceive benefits at some later date (i.e., retirement), the age distribution 
of the plan beneficiaries will be the single most important source of 
error in  this approximation. If  we let the percentage retired  (called 
PRET in the paper) be a proxy for the age distribution, then the fol- 
lowing simple model will  illustrate the relationship of  the exact ad- 
justment to the above approximation. 
Suppose that existing retirees are all paid  $1 n years from now and 
that current employees will receive $1 m years from now, rn > n. If R 
is the reported discount rate, the reported liability will be 
PRET 
+
 (1 - PRET) 
(1 + R)"  (1  + R)" 
L(R,  PRET)  = 
The  exact2 adjustment  factor  for  a  common  rate  of  10%  is  thus 
L(10,PRET) + L(R,PRET). The following table gives values for the 
exact factor when n = 10, and m =  40, for the range of values of R  and 
PRET encountered in the data. 
R  PRET (% retired) 
(Reported  Approximate factor 
discount rate)  O%  10%  25%  50%  R/10% 
4%  .11  .23  .35  .46  .40 
7%  .33  .53  .64  .71  .70 
10%  1  .oo  1 .oo  1 .oo  1 .oo  1.00 
13%  2.93  1.61  1.42  1.35  1.30 
Notice that for any given reported rate R less than lo%, there is a 
positive relationship between the exact adjustment factor and PRET. 
For reported  rates in excess of  the common rate  (lo%), there is a 
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2.C.2  Implications for the study 
One of  the main regression results of the study is a strong negative 
relationship between funding and PRET. Since by far the majority of 
the firms reported discount rates below  lo%, this means that this re- 
lationship would have been even more strongly negative had the exact 
adjustment factors been used. This analysis therefore strengthens that 
particular result. 
However, if  the assumed common discount rate is lower, for ex- 
ample, the average reported rate of 7%, then this regression result will 
quite possibly be significantly weakened, at the very least for the firms 
reporting discount rates above 7%. 
This then leads to the question, what is the correct common discount 
rate? Feldstein and Mdrck (1983) used the prevailing Baa rate on the 
assumption that the accrued liabilities are a fixed nominal cash flow 
stream. However, they also gave evidence that investors use something 
closer to the average reported rate to value pension liabilities. This is 
consistent with a view that accrued liabilities are partially  inflation 
indexed, perhaps because of some implicit contract in which the firm 
shares inflation risk with the beneficiaries. While Bulow (1982) casts 
doubt on why such an implicit contract should exist in the first place, 
it cannot be ruled out in an empirical study of this nature. 
2.C.3 
There is one aspect of the data that is particularly  troublesome to 
me, and that is the fact that only about 10% of the firms have under- 
funded pension  plans.  For example, with funding as the dependent 
variable, what does it mean to have a positive coefficient on bond rating, 
as predicted by the corporate financial perspective, in  such a sample 
when the R2  in addition is only in the range .04-.09?  Because so many 
plans are overfunded, I see this as weak evidence for the financial slack 
effect, but not the pension put effect. Moreover, the discussion of the 
data in  table 2.12 by Bodie et al. makes it difficult to make any case 
for the pension put effect. 
Alternatively,  it  could be  that  corporations  manage their pension 
plans with a different view of the true nature of their pension liabilities. 
If an average rate of 7% is the more appropriate one at which to discount 
the liabilities, then about half the plans will be underfunded, and there 
may then be some evidence for the pension put effect. It is then difficult 
to reinterpret  the regressions in  the paper.  however, in view of  my 
earlier comments on possible  sources of  error in  the  discount rate 
adjustment factor. 
As to the strong relationship between asset mix and size (VPL), I 
would be much happier if the independent variable had been log (VPL) 
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since Friedman's data clearly shows a big asymmetry in the distribution 
of pension plan assets. The largest pension plans are therefore outlying 
observations, and the regressions in tables 2.10 and 2.11 could just be 
telling us that a few of  the very  large pension  plans have a higher 
proportion invested in stocks. 
2.C.4  Conclusion 
This paper shows that corporate pension plans are in part managed 
from an integrated corporate financial perspective. In my view it gives 
strong evidence of  the tax effect, weaker evidence for the financial 
slack effect, and little if any evidence for the pension put effect. It also 
points out very clearly that we still have a lot explaining to do. I would 
like to see an analysis that more carefully takes into account the dis- 
count rate adjustment factor, since the effects could potentially alter 
the nature of the findings of the paper. 
Overall, this is an important and thought-provoking study that will 
affect future work in this area both empirically and theoretically. 
Notes 
1. This is the approach as taken by Feldstein and Mqirck  (1983). 
2. That is, exact for this model. 
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